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Abstract: This article intends to discuss the implications of certain questions posed by Amerindian perspectivism 
to psychoanalytical experience. That’s because a central question of perspectivism raised by Viveiros de Castro 
can be transposed to the field of psychoanalysis: how to create conditions for ontological self-determination of 
the other when we all have our ontological presuppositions? Following the author’s claim that the anthropologist 
should make a good enough description, an articulation is traced with the experience in psychoanalysis from 
considerations raised by Winnicott’s theory. Finally, to illustrate the discussed issues, an experience report in 
clinical research is presented.
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This article’s title emphasizes some of the matters 
we intend to deal with. At first, the question asked is: “can 
anthropology contribute to research in psychoanalysis?”. 
It is necessary to highlight, by way of introduction, 
that the notion of research in psychoanalysis – and this 
includes both methodological and theoretical issues – is 
not unanimous. What, however, seems to be unanimous 
among those who discuss psychoanalytical research is 
the Freudian affirmation (Freud, 1923/1977) that theory 
and clinic are inseparable. Nonetheless, as pointed out by 
Verztman and Viana (2014), research in psychoanalysis 
has nowadays taken new paths since Freud, making it 
more complex and creating new issues for the seemingly 
obvious inseparability between clinic and theory.
Besides being heterogenous, the psychoanalytical 
field, as indicated by Roussillon (2014), has a fundamental 
distinction regarding other scientific research: while other 
knowledge fields have performed a kind of assassination 
of its great characters in order to achieve the right to 
think accordingly to its own traditions, but independently 
from them, psychoanalysis has remained, many times, 
connected to the guidance of its great masters (a research 
is conducted under a Lacanian, Winnicottian, Bionian 
guidance, etc.). The research in psychoanalysis becomes, 
constantly, intrinsically associated to the guidance of its 
precursors, looking for the confirmation and validation 
of the well-respected concepts, which may obliterate the 
reading of some clinical phenomena.
Given this scenario, the author insists: it is 
necessary to perform a completely fundamental operation 
in clinical research, an operation of assassinating the 
fetishism of theory (Roussillon, 2014, p. 57). Would that be 
a call for clinical practice without theory? We know that 
the clinical meeting will never be deprived of theoretical 
premise and hypothesis, the “clinical format” itself is 
subsidiary of a long path in the field of ideas. The intention 
is not, thus, to exhume theory and glimpse a completely 
aseptic clinical meeting, also because this framing would 
already leave its exiting traces. Instead, how to discuss 
research in psychoanalysis considering what Roussillon 
calls a “theory fetishism”? This work’s proposal is to 
trace a dialogue with anthropology, more specifically 
with the Amerindian perspectivism, in order to raise some 
questions regarding psychoanalytical research and clinic.
Before that, however, it is necessary to specify 
that we do not intend to enter the considerably old 
dialogue between psychoanalysis and anthropology, 
which borders the psychoanalysis since Freud. Between 
partnerships and disagreements, these knowledge fields 
have been stumbling upon each other for years, having 
as an important reference, in the 20th century, the 
ethnopsychoanalysis, an effort by Geza Róheim and 
Georges Devereux in allying both disciplines in the 
theoretic-practical field. In this article, the approach 
to anthropology happens only as the discussion on 
Amerindian perspectivism – in the ethnography 
scope – raises significant questions for psychoanalysis. 
To portray this matter, we will discuss further on an 
example of clinical research in psychoanalysis in the 
intention of making some considerations in this field, 
inspired by the arguments defended by Viveiros de Castro 
in the anthropologic area.
Broadly, these discussions have as their background 
the following question: how to create the conditions 
for the other’s ontological self-determination when we 
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all have our own ontological suppositions? Viveiros de 
Castro (2002) points out that this in not a cognitive or 
psychological matter, but a epistemological and, above 
all, political one.
It would be possible to continue this reflection 
by pointing out the differences between a ethnographic 
study and the analytical device. We will, however, 
suspend this discussion to better explain its implications 
in the ethnographic scope and, then, ask what does the 
psychoanalyst and, more specifically, the research in 
psychoanalysis has to do with the theme.
Amerindian perspectivism
Ethnography is usually understood as a 
methodology for qualitative research in the field 
of anthropology. It is, above all – based on the 
considerations by Geertz (1978) –, a dense description 
by an anthropologist about a field. Most commonly, one 
thinks of an anthropologist who goes to the field equipped 
with a theory to interpret native people (words commonly 
used in anthropology to designate those who constitute a 
field). However, according to Viveiros de Castro (2002), 
there are serious theoretical and practical implications 
in conceiving the departure of an anthropologist with 
his/her interpretative apparatus and a native person that 
will be studied by them. Those are consequences that 
concern the asymmetry in the legitimacy conferred to the 
discourses that are under a relationship of knowledge and, 
particularly, to the order relationships among discourses. 
This order, as pointed out by the author, is certainly 
attributed and not innate; for him, nobody is born an 
anthropologist, and all the least, however curious they 
might be, a native” (Viveiros de Castro, 2002, p. 7). 
This happens because the anthropologist is seen having 
a epistemological advantage over the native as their 
discourses are not on the same level. Even though the 
meanings presented by the anthropologist depend on 
the native, it is the first one who holds the key for that 
meaning; it is the anthropologist who interprets, translates, 
contextualizes the native’s meanings. It is supposed that 
native people have a notion on religion, social bonds, 
among other concepts, but are unable to systematize it, 
that is, the knowledge by the subject requires ignorance 
by the object.
Viveiros de Castro (2002) indicates that, 
frequently, the anthropologist knows the native people 
de jure, even before he actually meets them. That is, the 
researcher knows from start certain concepts that he 
will supposedly observe in the native people, he knows 
what social relations, cognition, kinship, politics, religion 
are, and he interprets how these concepts are presented 
in a certain context. The anthropologist, therefore, ends 
up filling these notions with the context’s colors and, 
at the end, the native people become the anthropologist 
themselves in disguise. That being said, the thinking 
proposal of the Amerindian perspectivism is placed based 
on the following question: what happens if we refuse, in 
the anthropologists’ discourse, their strategical advantage 
over native discourse? (Viveiros de Castro, 2002, p. 7).
In order to consider this question seriously, it is 
necessary to understand that the studied procedures are 
radically diverse from the procedures that command 
the investigations and that, above all, at first, one 
does not know from start which ones they are. The 
“art of anthropology”, for this view, becomes the art 
of determining the issues posed by each culture, and 
not of finding solutions for issued posed by our culture 
(Viveiros de Castro, 2002). And that does not mean to 
simply consider the native as a subject. In this sense, the 
author warns us:
It is precisely because the anthropologist very easily 
takes the native to be an other subject that he cannot 
see him as an other subject. . . . It is by failing to 
accept the native’s condition of “nonsubject” (i.e., his 
being other than a subject) that the anthropologist 
introduces his sneaky advantage de jure, under the 
guise of a proclamation of de facto equality. Before 
the game even starts, he knows too much about the 
native: he predefines and circumscribes the possible 
worlds expressed by this other. (Viveiros de Castro, 
2013, p. 478).
The word Other recalls a Deleuzian concept that 
is defined not as a particular point of view, related to the 
subject, but as the possibility of having a point of view 
(Deleuze, 1988). It is the condition of the perceptive world, 
that is, which is beyond the reach of current perception, 
but that virtually exists as potentiality. Viveiros de Castro 
affirms that the Other is the expression of a possible 
world (p. 23). It is not, however, a hidden world, which 
must be unveiled, but a world that exists in potency, a 
possibility that truly exists, but does not currently exists 
outside its expression in the Other. Thus, the question 
moves from the problem if the native is or not a subject (it 
is clear that he is a subject), but comprises what may be a 
subject, that is, which are the possible worlds expressed 
by a subject. Anthropology, in this context, does not 
aims at producing technical essays on worldviews, once 
there is not only one world to be seen, but possible ones.
In this sense, the author considers that anthropology 
should not consider, from start, solid discourses on, for 
example, the nature of social relations, but that it should 
have only a vague idea of what is a relation. The question 
moves, thus, from “how do social relations in a certain 
context happen?” to “what is constituted as a social 
relation? More specifically, which terms can be formulated 
for the relationship between the ‘anthropologist’ and the 
‘native’?” (Viveiros de Castro, 2002, p. 12). Thus, the 
work of the anthropologist is not anymore to interpret but 
to experiment his own point of view and the other’s. It is, 
as we will detail further on, taking, after the encounter, 
his and the other’s point of view into consideration. It 
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is important to highlight that “point of view”, here, is 
not the same than idea or thinking, but, as pointed out 
by Viveiros de Castro (1996), the point of view is in the 
body (p. 9). The author is not talking, therefore, about a 
thinking experience in the sense of a imaginary entrance 
by the thinking itself in contact to the other, but to the 
entrance to the other thinking through the real experience. 
This experience aims to affirm the rightful equivalence 
between the anthropologist and the native’s discourses, 
as well as the mutually constituting condition of both 
discourses, which can only come to exist as such when 
entering a knowledge relationship.
Anthropological concepts, therefore, are not 
the result of an interpretation, but express a relation 
and are, because of that, completely relational, both in 
their expression and content. The relation, however, 
is non-dialectical, such as the Hegelian proposal of 
the master and slave relation. We could approach it – 
although not dwelling long on the theme – as a kind of 
dialectic without synthesis, recalling the articulation that 
Merleau-Ponty (1945/2011) traces between body and mind. 
In this sense, the relation which Viveiros de Castro (2002) 
refers to is the one that creates both cultures in question. 
The anthropological knowledge is, therefore, relational as 
it deals with the affect of relations that mutually constitute 
the subject that knows and the one who supposedly will be 
known. For the author, all relationship is a transformation, 
an updating of a possible world.
But how to proceed in the practical field, facing 
this scenario and taking into account the ethnography 
as a dense description? The answer by Viveiros de 
Castro (2015) is assertive: “always leave a way out for 
the people you are describing” (p. 8). It is curious that, in 
the lecture named “Who’s afraid of the ontological Wolf? 
Some comments on an ongoing anthropological debate” 
(Viveiros de Castro), not yet translated into Portuguese, 
the author directly mentions Winnicott. Inspired by this 
psychoanalyst’s considerations, Viveiros de Castro (2015) 
proposes that ethnographers should base themselves in 
a sufficiently good description. It means not explaining 
the paradoxes, in the sense of allowing oneself not to 
ask what am I and what is the other, but to experience 
an area of undefined frontiers, a third area of creativity 
(corelated to the Winnicottian potential space).
We have found, at this point, an indication that may 
create questions for the field of research in psychoanalysis. 
It is important to highlight, however, that the rich 
discussion brought forth by Viveiros de Castro brings 
up a series of other questions in the psychoanalysis field, 
be it on the notion of intersubjectivity (widely discussed 
nowadays), be it in the corporeity domain (also very 
currently dear) or even in the domain of psychoanalytical 
diagnosis. The last domain as very well discussed by 
Christian Dunker (2011), by proposing the notion of “ways 
of life” in the sense of taking distance, in the Lacanian 
diagnosis field, from a neurotic-centered, androcentric 
and totemist-naturalist perspective. We indicate, for 
further studies, to deepen even further on these other 
debates, since, in this article, the aim is to specifically 
discuss issues regarding the research in psychoanalysis.
Clinical exploration
As aforementioned, based on the considerations by 
Roussillon (2013), research in psychoanalysis frequently 
suffers of an excess of respect for theory. Well, could 
not the critique that Viveiros de Castro traced on the 
hierarchical difference between the native and the 
anthropologist’s discourses be also made to the analyst’s 
discourse in relation to the analyzed one? Would we not 
be, in the psychoanalytical research, by overly valuing 
our masters, bearing a key that aims to unveil the sense 
carried but not known, by the patient? How can this 
question be expressed in the research field?
An important discussion highlighted by 
Roussillon (2013) approaches precisely the word research 
in the psychoanalytical field. According to the author, 
to research is to look for something. That is, when one 
talks about a research, that person has hypothesis of what 
there are looking for; in a certain way, the outcome is 
already implicit from start. The notion of hypothesis, 
although sometimes necessary, must be questioned, 
given that one takes the risk of reducing the field found 
to the hypothetical formulations, preventing the field 
itself to raise questions not covered by the hypothesis. In 
return, the author suggests the verb to explore, used by 
Winnicott (1969/1994) in the notion of psychoanalytical 
exploration. This notion indicated that one does not 
know what will be found, or even if something will be 
found at all. Thus, room is made for a creative space 
that has as a presumption to accept to learn things with 
the patients (Roussillon. 2014, p. 43). Moreover, also 
according to Roussillon (2014), based on this perspective, 
the assertion that the clinic is not a research practice is 
inverted. This happens because, even though we learn 
what are neuroses, limit-cases, repression, and fantasy, 
we never face these concepts themselves. What one faces 
is a lived experience, a discourse, a body or – to use 
Dunker’s words (2011) – a way of life. Through this view, 
clinical exploration becomes nodal to the field which is 
more widely called research in psychoanalysis.
Given that, it is necessary for a research in 
psychoanalysis to be based on, above all, issues related 
to clinical practice1. That is, a research that involves an 
exploration based on the clinical meeting. It is precisely the 
possibility of overlapping the interests by the clinic to the 
research, making it a possibility only when coordinated 
to the psychoanalytical experience.
1 It is clear that there are other methodologies for research in 
psychoanalysis. However, we aim to highlight the clinical research as 
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Psychoanalytical experience
Now, then, we follow to the second part of the 
work’s title: “establishing dialogues between perspectivism 
and psychoanalytic experience”. The word experience 
could have gone unnoticed, however, its presence in this 
sentence is not simply routine, since giving the notion of 
experience a central role in psychoanalytical theory and 
clinical practice helps us to glimpse a path dialoguing 
to the critique made both by Viveiros de Castro, in the 
anthropology domains, and by Roussillon, regarding the 
research in psychoanalysis. But what does the notion of 
experience in psychoanalysis mean? Given that the aim 
is not to elucidate such matter in this article, we indicate 
some considerations that aim to help one in reflecting 
on psychoanalytic research.
In the article “The aims of psycho-analytical 
treatment”, Winnicott (1962/1983) defends the 
psychoanalytical process predominantly as the possibility 
of experiencing. The experience which the author refers 
to does not concern an individual or solipsist experience. 
According to the indications by Naffah Neto (2007), all 
experiences are produced in the potential space (p. 231). 
Even though it is possible to discuss a pre-reflexive 
experience that dispenses with the potential space, this 
affirmation highlights that the experience cannot be 
considered an individual experience. The experience, 
when coordinated to the potential space, is not located 
in the individual psychic reality, nor on the external 
relationships of the individual (Naffah Neto, 2007), since 
the potential space, as defined by Winnicott (1953/1988), 
is the intermediary area where it is not necessary to 
distinguish between what is internal and what comes 
form the external world. The potential space is built 
under a time, more than spatial, rationale, that is, it is 
not a place, but a possibility of experiencing a time the 
brings together past, present, and future, and updates 
creatively new times and – why not – new possible worlds.
To affirm that psychoanalysis consists on an 
experience connected to the potential space creates 
a dislocation of the idea that understands the clinical 
object as the symbol of what was repressed or even as 
the symbolization through meaning-making. Given that 
the experience is not something that occurs internally, 
but in the transitional space. It means, then. Pointing out 
that the psychoanalytical practice does not concern only 
the analyst, nor only the analyzed person. Roussillon’s 
notions (2008), on the interplay, as well as Ogden’s (1994), 
with the idea of the analytical third, point out precisely 
this. The last author, dialoguing to the Winnicottian 
thinking, affirms that the analyst and the analyzed person 
compose a third analytical2, in his words: “a third subject, 
unconsciously co-created by analyst and analysand, which 
seems to take on a life of its own in the interpersonal field 
2 It is important to emphasize that it is not a triangulation, such as the 
oedipal triangulation.
between analyst and patient” (Ogden, 1994, pp. 11-12)3. 
The third is, therefore, a heterogenous unit. It is not, 
however, two subjects who create a third, is it precisely 
the creation of a third that exposes the tensions between 
both of them4; in Ogden’s words (1994): “there is no 
analyst, no analysand, no analysis in the absence of the 
third” (p. 63). The question, thus, does not lie on dividing 
the elements that constitute the analytical relation in 
an effort to determine which qualities belong to each 
participant individually, but the analytical practice, in this 
point of view, involves “an attempt to describe as fully 
as one can the specific nature of the experience of the 
interplay of individual subjectivity and intersubjectivity” 
(Ogden, 1994, p. 64, emphasis added).
Given that, the analytical practice does not 
aim to interpret or construct, but it concerns, above 
all, making certain happenings go through the area of 
experience – therefore, the area of original creativity 
(Naffah Neto, 2007). The analysts, in this case, ceases to 
be seen as someone who has an interpretation key for the 
meaning the analysand bears, but does not know. Their 
theoretical assumptions, devices and methods must be 
updated (or not) in this interplay created along with the 
patient. Such dislocation has significant consequences 
for the research in psychoanalysis, once it takes distance 
from a validation or not of a theory to allow a type of 
exploration. For Roussillon (2014), if one does not take into 
account what happens between two subjects, all models 
are false. Or approximate ones (p. 57). Also according to 
the author, the research places itself in clinical practice 
by suspecting of certain devices we take as true, or even 
fetishize.
To understand clinical practice as experience 
is being able to question theoretical assumptions, 
exploring – and not necessarily researching – the blind 
spots of our own postulates. In this sense, paraphrasing 
Viveiros de Castro (2002), the “art of psychoanalysis” 
becomes the art of determining the issues brought forth 
by each analytical relation, and not of finding solutions 
for issues posed by the theory.
An example…
Facing the theoretical scope discussed, we will 
debate some aspects concerning a clinical research in 
psychoanalysis, in the sense of coordinating certain 
issues raised during its investigation process to what 
was exposed in the previous sections. It is a research that 
was begun by the Núcleo de Estudos em Psicanálise e 
Clínica da Contemporaneidade (NEPECC – Center of 
3 For a better deepening on this matter, it would be necessary to trace a 
brief path that has inspired the notion. A path that begun with the notion 
of projective identification by Melanie Klein, reviewed by Wilfred Bion 
and, later on, by André Green.
4 It is clear that the analytical third should not be understood as a third 
subject, but as a temporalized space, just as the potential space.
Psicologia USP   I   www.scielo.br/pusp
408
408
Thais Klein, Julio Sergio Verztman & Fernanda Pacheco-Ferreira
Studies in Psychoanalysis and Contemporaneity Clinic)5, 
in 20146. This investigation, still on going, has as its object 
the psychoanalytical care offered to subjects that reached 
the center complaining of compulsion. It is necessary to 
highlight that this word is widely used by such subjects 
to qualify their various modalities of suffering and to 
make them tangible. Despite the many interest areas 
raised by this research, we will discuss only one of its 
elements: the transformation in the team’s point of view 
on what they though they intended to investigate. This 
happens because, as we previously highlighted, even 
though theoretical hypotheses are sometimes important, it 
is necessary to be attentive to the experience that creates 
new possible worlds, not only between the analyst and 
the analysand, but between the research project and the 
act of researching.
In this sense, we intend to transmit to the reader 
a path in which the changes in certain positions is more 
important than explaining the places to be surpassed in 
a trajectory. In agreement to the authors discussed in this 
article, we aimed at taking distance from the notion that 
the act of researching indicates a defined finishing line, 
exemplified by a hypothesis to be confirmed, refuted, 
or even simply assessed. Out hypotheses were only 
the witness of our pre-conceptions, of the contextual 
condensation of who we were and what we were facing 
when we decided to begin our journey. This journey, 
however, has a previous history, a narrative that can be 
told and some issues that symbolized the motivation to 
begin such movement.
Since 2002, we use a methodological tool developed 
by ourselves, and inserted in the field of qualitative 
methodologies for research. It is the “Psychoanalytical 
study of multiple clinical cases”7, which consists broadly 
on the investigation of clinical cases as the guiding north 
of hypotheses and research production. It is important to 
highlight that our clinical research designs have, up to 
now, always become crucial to a criterion around which 
the reception of subjects for treatment must be performed. 
Usually, this criterion, sometimes called a filter, is a 
suffering index that condenses subjective elements 
pointing out the symptomatic field. Choosing this filter 
indicates a “pre-concept”, a series of expectations by 
us, the result of which always being an mismatched 
encounter. To support this mismatch is the basic task of 
such a research. Maybe even better than the expression 
mismatch, it is highlighting, above all, a relationship that 
inevitably creates, as we have mentioned, a possible world. 
It is necessary, however, to consider that the criterion 
5 The works by this Center can be accessed at http://nepecc.psicologia.ufrj.br.
6 The project was named “Estudo psicanalítico das compulsões em 
pacientes com diagnóstico psiquiátrico de TOC e patologias afins: uma 
pesquisa exploratória”, approved by the Research Ethics Committee 
(CEP) of the Institute of Psychiatry of the Universidade Federal do Rio 
de Janeiro (IPUB–UFRJ), in the same year.
7 For further details on this methodological tool, see Verztman et al. 
(2006), Verztman (2013), and Verztman and Viana (2014).
used to receive our clients will determine completely 
the framework used for all findings built, for any kind of 
data interpretation, for all contributions that, by chance, 
may be given to literature for all aspects underlined in 
the singular clinical meetings, which are our main target.
In a research previous to our study on compulsion, 
we have explored the universe of shame based on 
psychoanalytical care of subjects with psychiatric diagnose 
of social phobia (Andrade, Pacheco-Ferreira & Verztman, 
2013, 2014; Pinheiro, Verztman, Venturi & Barbosa, 2006; 
Verztman, 2013, 1014; Verztman, Herzog & Pinheiro, 
2009). When we begun this investigation, the shame 
theme did not appear consistently on psychoanalytical 
literature8. Clinical data of a previous research (Pinheiro, 
Verztman & Barbosa, 2006; Pinheiro et al., 2006; 
Verztman, Pinheiro, Barbosa, Jordão & Montes, 2007; 
Verztman et al., 2006) had made us suppose that shame 
could be an index of narcissistic suffering in a clinical 
and cultural context where the exposition to the gaze of 
an anonymous other would increasingly acquire more 
traumatizing potential.
Within this context, a young timid patient pointed 
out, through symptoms related to trichotillomania, that 
the action dimension could also run autonomous from 
associativity up to a certain point. That was how, in mid-
2013, after finishing our research on timid subjects, we 
decided to use, as reception criteria for a new research, 
the theme of compulsion9, widening its spectrum to cover 
what psychiatrists call alterations in impulse control. We 
have formulated as exclusion criteria complaints related to 
eating disorders, as well as to substance use dependency. 
We have proceeded as such for these symptomatic 
conditions were better mapped and discussed in our 
field, besides demanding specificities in clinical handling, 
which could disperse us of our investigative work.
It is important to point out a distinctive trait of this 
investigation in relation to the others. The compulsion 
symptom – unlike the universes investigated in previous 
researches, as the shame, somatic diseases, as lupus, or 
even melancholia ones – is an invention of psychoanalysis. 
It is the most sophisticated symbol of the presence of the 
Freudian unconscious in the action field. The clinical case 
of the “Rat Man” (Freud, 1909/1976) has consolidated in a 
unprecedented way the function of the psychic conflict in 
the origins of a neurosis, descripted in a exemplary way. 
We have prepared ourselves, thus, to receive prominently 
obsessive subjects, even if they were not ipsis litteris 
representants of the obsessive neurotic described by Freud. 
We supposed that we would find heterogenous aspects in 
this clinic when compared to the classic model, frailties in 
the narcissistic constitution that were little treated by the 
father of psychoanalysis but that were intuited by post-
Freudian authors, besides the hope of receiving subjects 
8 It is possible to cite Tisseron’s book (1992) as a significant stimulus to 
our endeavor.
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for treatments that were less defined by the oedipal model 
(even though they were not the majority of cases), which 
would allow us to do a comparative activity so dear to 
our work process. We had, however, great surprises.
Up to now, we have received seven subjects for 
attendance; five of them are still under our care. The 
heterogeneity of relational modalities and subjective 
styles found in these patients is unprecedent in the fifteen 
years the NEPECC has functioned. The first point that 
caused us strangeness was the fact that, even though six 
subjects were undergoing psychiatric treatments due to 
the diagnosis of obsessive compulsive disorder (OCD), 
only in one of them we have perceived the presence 
of elements that made us supposed some closeness to 
the obsessive clinical style familiar to psychoanalysis. 
We already expected to find some disjunction between 
obsessive neuroses and OCD. However, this disjunction 
has reached levels never conceived by us.
We have highlighted four of these cases, the 
elements of which seem to us clearer, and formulated 
different diagnostic hypothesis for each one of them within 
the psychoanalytical nosology. When we perceived the 
used we had made of the diagnostic/nosology apparatus to 
describe our clinic, we went through a second moment of 
strangeness. We could not let go of the initial localization 
that the diagnostic circumscription produces. It guides 
us, partly, as to certain care and indicates tools we can 
use in the treatment. On the other hand, the diagnosis 
can acquire a certain excessive glow in our gaze and 
blind us to central issues brought forth by these subjects. 
We believe that the role of diagnosis in our research 
will always be a tension point, which brings us together 
and drives us away from each other. We hope that a 
better adjustment to our research subjects will place the 
diagnosis in a little significant role for describing and 
analyzing our findings.
Given this scenario, we have perceived that the 
team’s first reaction to this unexpected heterogeneity was 
to look for other expressions to characterize the nosology 
field. Subjective styles, relational models, psychic 
organizations, among others, were used spontaneously 
instead of any more usual and technical term that could 
characterize a type of classification process. We do 
not intend to discuss the hard and complex theme of 
psychoanalytical diagnosis. We simply aim to highlight 
that meeting these patients has produced an interpretation 
effect in our team, putting some of our assumptions in 
suspension, in this case, the diagnosing activity itself.
Although it is not possible to go deeper in the 
description of heterogeneity of clinical styles – as we prefer 
to call it – it is important to highlight that the effects of 
researching on the researchers are not limited to this point. 
We remind that six of our seven subjects have received the 
same psychiatric diagnosis of OCD. Despite that, this is the 
first investigation in which we have intuited to be in face of a 
psychotic subject. The almost complete lack of neurosis and 
the match to psychotic and melancholic characteristics, as 
well as the limit-cases in its place, has shaken many of our 
previous beliefs to the investigation. Beliefs that call out to 
the construction of the obsessive neurosis category itself in 
our discipline. Beliefs that need to be constantly reviewed 
so that the encounter with what is unique can happen in our 
clinical practice. We highlight the importance of facing the 
act of researching as the production of an indetermination 
field, where one cannot recognize oneself after having 
begun the journey. Meeting the researched subjects, the 
possible worlds, has transformed both the researchers and 
the research’s hypothesis. Thus, only when it is possible 
to become another in ourselves, through this encounter, 
can we perceive ourselves as researchers, specially in the 
field of clinical research.
Final remarks
Lastly, it is necessary to highlight that we do not 
intend to closely associate the proposals discussed by 
Viveiros de Castro in the scope of anthropology to the 
report of a clinical practice mentioned as an example. 
We do, however, consider that the discussions raised in 
the field of Amerindian perspectivism bring extremely 
relevant contributions to the discussion on clinical 
research in psychoanalysis. This happens because, as 
we have highlighted in NEPECC’s experience, it is 
important to make room for the encounter between 
research hypothesis and the investigated field to transform 
our own conception. The starting point, thus, is only a 
supporting point, unfortunately unavoidable when one 
intends to sail on such vast seas. It does not confer any 
safety as to its own fairness as a right measure for the 
encounter with the world.
The field of research in psychoanalysis is 
extensive – this article is, thus, far from bringing consistent 
contribution for the field as a whole. It intended only 
to indicate some possible contributions of Amerindian 
perspectivism for clinical research, illustrated by the 
report of a experience. We indicate, thus, the possibility 
of continuing this rich conversation. We hope that, based 
on this perspective, the research in psychoanalysis will 
be able to glimpse a path in the direction of creating 
possible worlds, to use Viveiros de Castro’s expression, 
and not only to confirm questions posed by the hypothesis 
themselves, or the worlds of its masters and followers.
A antropologia contribui para a pesquisa em psicanálise? Sobre o perspectivismo e a experiência psicanalítica
Resumo: O artigo visa discutir as implicações de certas questões colocadas pelo perspectivismo ameríndio para a experiência 
psicanalítica. Isso porque uma pergunta central do perspectivismo levantada por Viveiros de Castro pode ser deslocada para o 
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campo psicanalítico, a saber: como criar condições para autodeterminação ontológica do outro quando todos nós temos nossos 
pressupostos ontológicos? Acompanhando a aposta do autor de que o antropólogo deve fazer uma descrição suficientemente 
boa, traça-se uma articulação com a experiência em psicanálise a partir de considerações suscitadas pela teoria winnicottiana. 
Por fim, para ilustrar as questões discutidas, apresenta-se um relato de experiência em pesquisa clínica a partir da psicanálise.
Palavras-chave: pesquisa, antropologia, psicanálise, clínica.
L’anthropologie contribue-t-elle à la recherche en psychanalyse? Dialogues entre le perspectivisme et 
l’expérience psychanalytique
Résumé: Cet article a l’objectif de discuter lesimplications des certaines questions posées par le perspectivisme amérindien 
sur l’expérience psychanalytique. En effet, une question centrale du perspectivisme soulevée par Viveiros de Castro peut être 
déplacée vers le domaine de la psychanalyse: comment créer des conditions pour l’autodétermination ontologique de l’autre 
lorsque nous avons tous nos présuppositions ontologiques? Suit à l’affirmation de l’auteur, selon laquelle l’anthropologue 
devrait faire une description suffisamment bonne, une articulation est tracée avec l’expérience en psychanalyse à partir des 
considérations soulevées par la théorie de Winnicott. Enfin, pour illustrer les problèmes discutés, on présente un rapport 
d’expérience en recherche clinique.
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¿Puede la antropología contribuir a la investigación en psicoanálisis? Trazando diálogos entre el 
perspectivismo y la experiencia psicoanalítica
Resumen: El artículo trata de discutir las implicaciones de ciertas indagaciones planteadas en el perspectivismo amerindio para 
la experiencia en psicoanálisis. La pregunta central del perspectivismo hecha por Viveiros de Castro puede ser desplazada al 
campo psicoanalítico: ¿cómo crear condiciones para la autodeterminación ontológica del otro cuando todos tenemos nuestros 
presupuestos ontológicos? A partir de la apuesta del autor de que el antropólogo debe hacer una descripción suficientemente 
buena, se desarrolla la experiencia en psicoanálisis fundamentada en la teoría de Winnicott. Por último, para ilustrar las 
cuestiones discutidas, se presenta un relato de experiencia en investigación clínica a partir del psicoanálisis.
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